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NOTE
THE SWORD AND THE STEEPLE: A HISTORY OF
CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES AND AN ANALYSIS OF
FALLS CHURCH V. PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES
M. Steven Osborne†
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States of America has developed into a large, pluralistic
society. One feature of many pluralistic societies is the reality of multiple
religions. With each religion comes, to some extent, a polity.1 From time to
time, the civil law of state and federal governments have had to interact
with these religious polities. How the civil law corresponds with the
canonical laws of these religious polities has tremendous import for many
different areas of the law.
One particular area where this correspondence is important is the field of
ecclesiastical property law. Recently, numerous hierarchical churches2 have
been undergoing divisions over issues of doctrine and practice. Legal
questions have arisen regarding who owns property claimed both by the
dissenters and the general church after a formal division has taken place.
This has led to numerous civil cases in many states. This Note will explore
one such case from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Falls Church v.
Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S. This Note will consist of three parts.
First, it will explain the factual and procedural background to the Falls
Church case. Second, it will discuss the history of the legal status of
ecclesiastical property and how courts, both in Europe and the United

† Business Manager, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2016). The author would like to recognize his parents and
family for raising him to be the man that he is today. He would like to thank Pastors John
and Shirley Tasch for preparing and training him to pursue the call of God on his life. Most
importantly, the author gives all glory to God, without whose purpose there is no virtue and
without whose anointing there is no means to reach that purpose.
1. When the term ‘‘polity’’ is used in this Note, it will be in reference to a politically
organized unit having a distinct legal identity.
2. When this Note refers to hierarchical churches it refers to churches that have
governing structures built on an episcopal model or a similarly structured system. These
churches typically have more centralized contral with bishops and a ranking of church
officials.
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States, have applied trust law to ecclesiastical property. Finally, this Note
will discuss what the policy of the courts should be in the future and how
these suggestions, if applied, would have affected the Falls Church holding.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The conflict that gave rise to Falls Church came from a dispute within the
Episcopal Church. The church has, in recent years, been torn asunder as
conflict has arisen between the hierarchy of the Episcopal Church and the
orthodox Anglican congregations that seek independence.3 The division
revolves around doctrinal issues, particularly in matters of the church’s
public witness.4 All congregations and ecclesiastical bodies involved in the
dispute were originally part of the larger Anglican Communion.5 However,
the new organization formed by the breakaway congregations are not
recognized as being a part of the Anglican Communion by the Archbishop
of Canterbury.6 This communion is organized hierarchically. However,
unlike the Catholic Church, the Anglican Communion is decentralized and
power within the American Anglican community largely rests with the
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States.7
In response to what they considered to be an embrace of heretical actions
by the Protestant Episcopal Church (‘‘the general church’’), numerous
congregations around the United States broke away from that polity and
sought to re-associate with a different ecclesiastical body.8 Many of these
churches, including the Falls Church, associated with an Anglican
Communion in Nigeria and formed the Convocation of Anglicans in North
America (‘‘CANA’’) congregations.9 This created a more orthodox polity
that served as a counterbalance to the general church.
3. Michael Conlon, Episcopal Church dissidents move towards division, THOMSON
REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2008, 10:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/04/us-religionepiscopal-idUSTRE4B30Q320081204.
4. Id.
5. See Resolution 14: Episcopal Authority and Oversight, ANGLICAN COMMUNION (2015),
http://www.anglicancommunion.org/communion/acc/meetings/acc9/resolutions.cfm.
6. See Jennifer Berry Hawes, Archbishop says ACNA not part of the Anglican
POST
AND
COURIER
(Oct.
9,
2014,
2:52
PM),
Communion,
THE
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20141009/PC16/141009387.
7. The
Anglican
Communion,
THE
EPISCOPAL
CHURCH,
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/anglican-communion (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
8. See Alicia Constant, The Costly Faithfulness of the Falls Church, THE GOSPEL
COALITION (May 24, 2012), http://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/the-costly-faithfulnessof-the-falls-church.
9. Id.

2016]

THE SWORD AND THE STEEPLE

271

This division did not come without legal consequences. The separated
churches had to settle the question of who owned the property that the
break-away congregations used.10 The Falls Church property is located in
Fairfax County, Virginia, which is one of the highest valued real estate
markets in the country. The general church claimed that the Falls Church
and other CANA churches were merely holding the properties in trust for
the general church; and that now, because a separation had occurred, the
property should revert back to the general church.11
Falls Church was one of a string of cases that dealt with issues ranging
from who the parties were to whether religious documents should be
considered in ecclesiastical property cases.12 The Falls Church court
specifically faced the issue of how to apply “neutral principles of the law” to
a church property dispute.13 The neutral principles of the law doctrine has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that “there are neutral
principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be
applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded.”14
This issue has generated a great amount of deliberation from courts around
the country that have had to wrestle with this question.
Different states have taken different approaches to how they deal with
the issues associated with Falls Church. Many states have statutory schemes
that are more conducive to hierarchical churches than others.15 The court of
10. See generally Property Recovery Litigation, EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF VA.,
http://www.thediocese.net/News/Property_Recovery/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
11. See
generally
Church
Property
Dispute,
EPISCOPAL
CHURCH,
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/library/topics/church-property-dispute (last visited Oct. 4,
2015); Mary Schjonberg, State high court won’t reconsider decision against Falls Church Anglican,
EPISCOPAL CHURCH (June 14, 2013), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/library/ article/state-highcourt-won%E2%80%99t-reconsider-decision-against-falls-church-anglican.
DIOCESE
OF
VA.,
12. See
Property
Recovery
Litigation,
EPISCOPAL
http://www.thediocese.net/News/Property_Recovery/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
13. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 537 (Va.
2013).
14. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). The Court was operating out of a desire to
avoid entanglements that would implicate a First Amendment Establishment Clause issue.
The neutral principles approach has the effect of treating the ecclesiastical body as any other
corporation, using “neutral” principles of property law. Throughout this Note, the author
will attempt to convey that this approach, when applied in such a way that it ignores the
ecclesiastical polity of the church, is antithetical to the freedom and independence of the
church.
15. Compare Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d 530 (discussing Virginia Code § 57-1.1), with
Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013) (discussing Texas
corporation law).
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any state must consider the common and statutory law of that state, the
United States Constitution, and general principles of law when determining
the status of these congregations and, ergo, who is the owner of the
property.
In deciding this case, the Virginia Supreme Court considered Virginia
statutes regarding the corporate status of churches and the common law
that developed around the application of those statutes.16 Virginia’s antiestablishmentarian legacy has provided a strong bias in favor of
congregational churches. However, recent revisions to the Virginia Code
have opened up space for hierarchical churches to exercise more authority
in the Commonwealth.17
The manner in which ecclesiastical property cases are decided will have a
significant impact in determining questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and
property. It is imperative that the judicial branch provide the necessary
guidance in accordance with the rule of law.
A. Impact of Jones v. Wolf on Jurisprudence
In Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court explicitly and thoroughly applied
neutral principles of the law for the first time.18 That case involved a dispute
between a portion of a Georgia congregation and the general church to
which that congregation belonged.19 The Court vacated the decision of the
Georgia Supreme Court, which had been in favor of the majority of the
break-away congregation against the general church.20
The Court’s decision in Jones opened the door for state courts to
minimize the independence of ecclesiastical polities. Even though the
Establishment Clause functions to protect the independence of the Church,
the majority opinion in Jones ironically undermined the freedom of the
Church in the name of preserving establishment clause jurisprudence.
1. Justice Blackmun’s Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun issued the majority opinion, holding that the states
may exercise the option of using neutral principles of contract and property
law to determine church property disputes. The Court claimed the rule
allowed for courts to give deference to the highest decision making body

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 537-39.
Id.
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 610.
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within a religious polity, provided that courts did not address issues of
religious doctrine in doing so.
Blackmun’s opinion reflected the overarching concern that caused the
court to take up the case in the first place, namely, that the courts would
employ judgment in regards to doctrine when deciding which faction would
control the property. The idea was that using secular contract and property
law would relieve the court of the necessity of considering matters of
doctrine. The Virginia Supreme Court decision in Falls Church applied the
neutral principles doctrine in a way that took into account the religious
documents defining the polity of the church. However, other courts have
used the opportunity provided for them in the Jones decision to disregard
the religious documents of the church and apply the default provisions
provided in state statutes regarding corporations instead.
By utilizing the neutral principles approach, Justice Blackmun claimed
the new approach would be ‘‘completely secular in operation, and yet
flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and
polity.’’21 He pointed to the fact that the approach would allow lawyers and
judges to consider issues that were familiar to them.22 The neutral principles
approach promised to ‘‘free civil courts completely from entanglement in
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.’’23
The opinion still allowed for the examination of religious documents
under some circumstances in considering the intent of the parties.24
However, the Court still found that approach troublesome.25 While the
Court acknowledged that states may be in a position where they must
examine the religious documents, the Court did not require that they
consider those documents.26 This left open the possibility that courts may
bypass those documents altogether and simply apply secular property and
contract law in settling the dispute.27

21. Id. at 603.
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis added). There is reason to seriously doubt the promise of freedom
from entanglement in questions of polity. Church property disputes are inherently
intertwined with questions of identity, structure, and authority, all of which are issues of
polity.
24. Id. at 605.
25. Id. at 604. The court identified the necessity of using religious documents as a
‘‘difficulty.’’ This reveals the bias of the Court against the examination of religious documents
when considering intent.
26. Id. at 605.
27. See Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2014).
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The Court disregarded the necessity for deference to the decisions of the
highest authority within a particular church body.28 Despite its stated
disdain for courts speaking to issues of polity, the Jones court had no
problem reaffirming that the default rule for religious governance should be
majority rule.29 In the name of not legislating church polity, the Court
legislated church polity.
The passive-aggressive method of judicial interpretation is a hallmark of
Justice Blackmun’s jurisprudence. It is very similar to what he did in both
Roe v. Wade30 and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.31
In both of those cases, he articulated an opinion that expanded the power of
the Court over an area of law while simultaneously disclaiming judicial
power. Whether this method was borne out of a nuanced judicial mind or a
desire to be purposefully ambiguous to the point of deceit is unknown.
However, in Jones, like in Roe and Garcia, it merely added to the confusion.
2. The Principled Dissent in Jones
Justice Powell took up the task of giving the dissent in Jones.32 The
dissent did not discount the basic principles of law that would decide such
cases. Justice Powell stated, “Although the Court appears to accept
established principles that I have thought would resolve this case, it
superimposes on these principles a new structure of rules that will make the
decision of these cases by civil courts more difficult.”33 The “new structure
of rules” that Powell refered to was Blackmun’s crafty placement of the
courts between the general church and a congregation through the use of
secular law.
28. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605-06.
29. Id. at 607-08 (citing Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131 (1872)).
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (“In view of all this, we do not agree that,
by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are
at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in
preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the
State or a non-resident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has
still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.
These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman
approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’”).
31. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51, 554 (1985) (“It is
no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large
part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. . . . [Restraints] must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a
‘sacred province of state autonomy.’”(citation omitted)).
32. Jones, 443 U.S. at 610.
33. Id.
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The dissent criticized the majority position, claiming that it allowed for
the examination of church charters and constitutions only to the extent that
they contained language indicating that the congregation was holding
property in trust for the general church.34 It is these documents that provide
the basis for understanding what the church polity is and how that church
polity affects the property rights of the parties.35 The majority’s position is
that courts should examine these religious documents with a strictly and
purely secular lens.36 The Jones decision allows courts to reinterpret church
documents by leaving out the portions that do not speak directly to civil
property and trust law.37
One of the dissent’s key arguments dealt with the absurdity of trying to
half-way read a document.38 The dissent pointed out that the courts would
be denied relevant evidence of how the religious polity is structured if the
church documents were not read in their context.39 It stated, “The
constitutional documents of churches tend to be drawn in terms of religious
precepts. Attempting to read them ‘in purely secular terms’ is more likely to
promote confusion than understanding.”40 The dissent was correct in its
prediction that the Jones majority approach to neutral principles was more
likely to lead to confusion.41
3. Issue at Stake
The law respects the sacredness of assent and jurisdiction.42 It is
important that the courts give due deference to the mutual assent that the
general church and its individual congregations entered into when they
bound themselves together in a religious polity. While there are certainly
First Amendment issues that this Note will touch upon, there is an even
deeper legal issue relating to the nature of assent and the important role that
the courts have in upholding the assent of the parties and in recognizing
religious polities as distinct from other voluntary associations. The majority
34. Id. at 612.
35. Below, this Note will discuss the way in which the Jones decision serves to
undermine the respect for religious polities traditionally found within the law.
36. Jones, 443 U.S. at 612.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Compare Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530
(Va. 2013), with Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.594 (Tex. 2014).
42. Assent is self-evidently crucial to the law of contracts as well as the Constitutional
right to freedom of association. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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position places a potent weapon in the hands of those who seek to
undermine the authority and jurisdiction of the church.
4. The Broken Promise of Jones
The Jones Court promised that the need to examine questions of
religious polity would be obviated entirely through the use of the neutral
principles approach.43 According to Jones, “The neutral-principles approach
. . . obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical
polity or doctrine in settling church property disputes.”44 Yet, the Virginia
Supreme Court faced a situation where The Falls Church contended “that it
was not bound by the canons, including the Dennis Canon”45 because
“there is no evidence of mutual assent by The Falls Church with regard to
[The Protestant Episcopal Church] and the Diocese having any rights to the
property.”46 The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that “[a]s this
argument relates to the nature of the relationship between the parties, we
will address it here.”47 The Jones Court attempted to create an option that
would eliminate a situation where, “civil courts would always be required to
examine the polity and administration of a church to determine which unit
of government has ultimate control over church property.”48 This analysis
sought to circumvent the questions of assent and polity, but ultimately it
posed the threat of bringing decisions that should be made within an
ecclesiastical body under the authority of the State.

43. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605.
44. Id.
45. The Dennis Canon states,
All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission
or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in
which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is located. The existence of this
trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and authority of the Parish,
Mission or Congregation otherwise existing over such property so long as the
particular Parish, Mission or Congregation remains a part of, and subject to,
this Church and its Constitution and Canons.
Episcopal Archives, http://www.episcopalarchives.org/pdf/CnC/CandC_2009pp11-60.pdf
(last visited Nov. 8, 2015). This quote is found in Cannon 7, Section 4 within the cannon of
the Episcopal Church.
46. Fall Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 540 (Va.
2013).
47. Id.
48. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605.
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B. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.
The Falls Church was founded in 1732 as one of two congregations in the
Truro parish.49 In 1769, the church was built on the property that the
Protestant Episcopal Church would later claim as its own.50 The Protestant
Episcopal Church (“TEC”) was founded in 1789.51 The Falls Church
petitioned for, and was accepted to, membership in a Diocese of the
Protestant Episcopal Church in 1836.52
In 2003, a conflict arose within the TEC regarding what many dissident
members considered to be a break from orthodoxy on the part of the TEC.53
The congregation of the Falls Church voted overwhelmingly to join with
other churches in disaffiliating with the TEC on December 17, 2006.54 Six
other congregations in that Diocese joined with Falls Church, and together
they became a part of the CANA congregations.55
After these congregations broke away, they filed petitions pursuant to
Virginia Code § 57-9(A) to get the deeds to the property recognized as
being in the name of the CANA congregations.56 The TEC and the Diocese
responded by filing a complaint, claiming that all personal and real property
held by the congregations was being held in trust for them.57 They claimed
to have directed the trustees of the CANA congregations to transfer the
property back to the general church.58
The trial court in Falls Church used several factors to conclude that the
property belonged to the TEC, including: an examination of Virginia
statutes, the deeds, the constitutions and canons of the church, and the
course of dealing between the parties.59
In examining the deeds of the churches,60 the trial court found that the
first deed from 1746 conveyed the land to “the said Vestry of Truro
Parish.”61 The second, third, and fourth deeds were made out to “trustees of
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 534.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id.
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the Episcopal Church known and designated as the ‘Falls Church,’”
“Trustees for the Falls Church Episcopal Church,” and “Trustees of the Falls
Church.”62 There were also fifth and sixth deeds both conveying property to
“Trustees of the Falls Church, Falls Church, Virginia.”63 Deeds seven
through eleven were conveyed to “Trustees of the Falls Church
(Episcopal).”64
The trial court in Falls Church concluded that the frequent designation of
the church as Episcopal in the conveyances was an indication that the trust
was a unit of the TEC.65 The trial court held that a reasonable grantor would
have concluded, based upon the circumstances surrounding the
designations of the Falls Church in the conveyances, that they were
transferring property to a local Episcopal Church and that the church
would not be removed from the TEC or the Diocese without their consent.66
In considering the statutes, the trial court concluded that Virginia Code §
57-7.1 did not change Virginia’s longstanding rule against courts
recognizing trusts held for a general church.67 Instead, it concluded that
Virginia Code § 57-15 prohibited the the court from transferring the
property without the transfer being the desired outcome of the hierarchical
church leadership.68
The trial court then turned its attention to the constitutions and canons
of the church.69 The congregation had agreed to adhere to the canons and
constitutions as well as the doctrine of the Episcopal Church.70 This
attachment extended beyond spiritual matters to administrative matters
such as health and pension plans.71 The trial court also noted that the extent
of the general church’s administrative control also extended specifically

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The trial court stated that “each congregation was bound by the constitution and
canons of the general church and must acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Bishop; all clergy
must affirm they ‘conform to the Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship of the Episcopal
Church’ to be ordained; all congregations use the Book of Common Prayer; . . .” Id.
71. Id. (“Bishops must regularly visit parishes to examine the state of the churches; and
congregations must participate in the Diocesan health care plan, contribute to the Church
Pension Fund, and purchase fire, casualty and workers’ compensation insurance.”).
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over the use of the property.72 Particularly, it pointed to the regulations that
prohibited the congregation from alienating consecrated property without
permission from the TEC or the Diocese.73 Likewise, it noted that the
Diocese retained the right to declare the property abandoned if it ceased to
be used by a congregation of the TEC or the Diocese.74
When it came to the course of dealing between the parties, the trial court
looked at several factors.75 It looked at the fact that the congregation had
joined the general church in accordance with the general church’s rules.76 It
considered the church’s reputation in the community as an Episcopal
church.77 Perhaps even more importantly, it considered the fact that the
congregation sought permission from the Diocese before it encumbered
property.78 The Falls Church appealed this ruling, and the TEC and Diocese
cross-appealed in regards to the trial court’s interpretation of Virginia Code
§ 57-7.1.79
1. Issue in Falls Church
The Virginia Supreme Court, using a hybrid approach, partially
collapsed the distinction between neutral principles of the law doctrine and
the principle of deference. By stating that the prior existing relationship
between the general church and the congregation alone was enough to
establish that the property was being held in trust for the general church,80
the court opened the door for future courts to create a more flexible
approach in applying neutral principles.
The deferential approach articulated in the dissent of Jones v. Wolf would
direct the civil court focus on “ascertaining, and then following, the
decision made within the structure of church governance.”81 As a matter of
fact, the majority in Jones, wanted to “free civil courts completely from

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 536.
80. Id. at 540 (“As a number of courts in other states have noted, the Dennis Canon
‘merely codified in explicit terms a trust relationship that has been implicit in the
relationship between local parishes and dioceses since the founding of [TEC] in 1789.’”
(citation omitted)).
81. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 618 (1979).

280

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:269

entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”82 Yet,
the Virginia Supreme Court, claiming that Virginia Code § 57-7.1 would
not incorporate the Dennis Canon,83 looked to the polity of the church in
coming to the conclusion that a trust existed.84
The holding of the Virginia Supreme Court was a step in the direction of
a more deferential approach. This direction, if continued or adopted as
standard by the United States Supreme Court, could allow churches to
apply their ecclesiastical laws in regards to secular objects, including
property.
III. HISTORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
In order to gain a proper understanding of the issues surrounding the
legal debate over implied trusts and ecclesiastical polities, it is important to
understand the history of ecclesiastical property disputes. This article will
explore the legal history behind church property disputes from before the
time of Constantine up to the present. Understanding the development of
the law in this matter should inform the reader’s understanding of implied
trusts in today’s context.
A. Antiquity
Ecclesiastical property disputes are not a new phenomenon.85 The early
church historian Eusebius recorded a property dispute that occurred when
a bishop, Paul of Samosata, was accused of teaching heterodox doctrine and
was removed from the bishopric.86 Upon the removal of Paul, the bishop
Domnus was appointed to take over the church at Antioch.87 Although he
had lost the bishopric, Paul refused to relinquish control of the church
82. Id. at 603.
83. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 539 (“[A]ny express trusts purportedly created by the
Dennis Canon were ineffective in Virginia.”).
84. Id. at 540 (“In the present case, we need look no further than the Dennis Canon to
find sufficient evidence of the necessary fiduciary relationship.”).
85. EUSEBIUS, THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 248 (G.A. Williamson trans., Penguin Book
1965). Eusebius’ account of the dispute between the Church and the wayward bishop Paul of
Samosata is among the earliest accounts of an ecclesiastical property dispute being settled in
a civil court. Id.
86. Id. Eusebius states that Paul of Samosata held “low, degraded opinions about
Christ.” Id. at 244. This charge sprang from Paul’s regarding “Him as in His nature just an
ordinary man.” Id. Paul also sustained other charges, including robbing and manipulating
his church, as well as depriving the injured of their rights. Id. at 246-47.
87. Id. at 248.
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building.88 The bishops appealed the issue to the Emperor Aurelian, who
rendered a verdict for the bishops, and forced Paul to relinquish control.89
Such favorable legal treatment towards the church by the Roman
government was more of an aberration than the norm before the reign of
Constantine.90 Before the Edict of Milan, Christians were subjected to harsh
persecution under the Emperor Diocletian.91
In the years leading up to Diocletian’s reign, churches had become more
confident in their ability to acquire property and to expand architecturally.92
Eusebius, who was a contemporary of this particular persecution, records
that many Christians “[n]o longer satisfied with the old buildings . . . raised
from the foundations in all the cities churches spacious in plan.”93 The
Emperor Diocletian, eager to restore the glory of Rome through a renewed
pagan piety, began a systematic persecution.94 Part of the Diocletian
persecution involved the seizure of church property.
The legal status of the church changed with the rise of Constantine to the
imperial throne.95 After Diocletian’s death, control of the Roman Empire
was divided between several emperors, among them was Constantine.
Constantine ended the Diocletian persecution edicts in his portion of the
empire, and began the process of providing restitution for the losses

88. Id.
89. Id. Eusebius’s full account is as follows:
When Paul had lost both the orthodoxy of his faith and his bishopric, Domnus,
as already stated, took over the ministry of the Antioch Church. But Paul
absolutely refused to hand over the church building; so the Emperor Aurelian
was appealed to, and he gave a perfectly just decision on the course to be
followed: he ordered the building to be assigned to those to whom the bishops
of the religion in Italy and Rome addressed a letter. In this way the man in
question was thrown out of the church in the most ignominious manner by the
secular authority.
Id.
90. Id. at 249 (“Such was the treatment that we received from Aurelian at that time. But
as his reign went on, he changed his attitude towards us and was now pressed by some of his
advisers to instigate a persecution against us . . . .”).
91. Peter J. Leithart, The Great Persecution, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2012/03/great-persecution.
92. EUSEBIUS, supra note 85, at 257.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 258. Eusebius describes seeing “places of worship thrown down from top to
bottom, to the very foundations, the inspired holy Scriptures committed to the flames in the
middle of public squares . . . .” Id.
95. Peter J. Leithart, Constantine and the Ecclesial Polis, FIRST THINGS, (Mar. 10, 2009),
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2009/03/constantine-and-ecclesial-polis.
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suffered by the Christians in his region.96 Upon the signing of the Edict of
Milan, this process was extended to the entire empire.97
With legal recognition, the position of church property changed
dramatically. Constantine, and then succeeding emperors, granted the
church property.98 Constantine engaged in an extravagant building program
that constructed church buildings on the sites of landmark events in
Christianity.99 Constantine gave churches in Rome rent collected from
various landed estates,100 estimated at “more than four hundred pounds of
gold per year,”101 as well as large amounts of property.102 These large gifts
would “la[y] the foundations for the church’s enduring wealth in later
centuries.”103
Even with the fall of the Roman Empire, Christianity in what used to be
the Western Roman Empire and beyond continued to maintain property.
Particularly, Christian missions were conducted among barbarian tribes,
through use of monasteries maintained by the Benedictine monks. As
antiquity came to a close and what we know as the Middle Ages dawned,
the church was in a good position financially.104
B. Medieval
By the medieval period, the church had stupendous property holdings.
“[I]t is said to have owned between one-fourth and one-third of the land of
western Europe.”105 The church attained this land not only through gifts
and taxes as mentioned above, but also through “agricultural,
manufacturing, and commercial enterprises” maintained by the church
through those properties.106 The medieval period also resulted in the

96. RODNEY STARK, THE TRIUMPH OF CHRISTIANITY 171 (2011).
97. Constantine Christian History, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Aug. 8, 2008, 12:56 PM),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ch/131christians/rulers/constantine.html.
98. STARK, supra note 96, at 174.
99. Id. at 173-74. Constantine’s building projects included churches on the sites of Jesus’
tomb, the Mount of Olives, and the Nativity in Bethlehem. Id.
100. Id. at 174
101. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
102. Id. (“Constantine donated ‘an extraordinary amount of property’ to the church.
Thus, ‘massive grants of land and property were made . . . [and an] avalanche of precious
metals.’”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 237 (1983).
106. Id.
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development of church canon law. These canons would speak to many
issues, including issues of ecclesiastical property.107
Secular law’s influence on canon property law surpasses its influence on
other areas of canon law.108 The church did not view property as having a
sacramental character, thus secular law influenced canon property law more
significantly than any other area of canon law.109 The church saw property
as a resource within the church’s temporal power.110
Due to the feudal context of the medieval period, “ecclesiastical property
rights were often closely interconnected with secular property rights.”111
The parish112 would often hold the land of a bishopric113 or abbey114 and
exercise feudal powers over that property.115 There were even times when a
bishopric might hold the same land as a baron.116
The interconnectedness created a dualistic approach to property law in
regards to ecclesiastical property.117 When a dispute arose over the ground
rent owed by the parish to the bishopric or abbey, it would usually be settled
in ecclesiastical courts according to canon law.118 “[D]isputes over feudal
dues and services owed by the bishopric or abbey to the baron would
normally be within the jurisdiction of secular courts and would be settled by
secular law[.]”119 The church, in the exercise of its property rights, operated
both within and outside of the feudal and urban economic orders.120
Although it was tied to secular law, canon law did not cede all property
considerations to secular law.121 There were actually ecclesiastical
considerations and certain underlying canon law principles that continued
107. Id.
108. Id. (“[T]he canon law of property was influenced by contemporary secular law to a
much greater extent than was the canon law of family relations.”).
109. Id. (“[I]t was never suggested that property—even ecclesiastical property—had a
sacramental character.”).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. A parish is a jurisdictional unit of the church. Id.
113. A bishopric is land under the authority of a particular local bishop. Id.
114. An abbey is property related to the monastic orders. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 237-38.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 238. It should be noted that even in that context, “jurisdiction . . . might be a
matter of contest between the ecclesiastical and the secular courts.” Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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to inform the medieval church’s property law jurisprudence.122 As a matter
of fact, there were several contributions that carried over into secular law
and continue to impact property law as a whole today.123
1. Impact of the Papal Revolution
To gain a complete understanding of the ecclesiastical position in regards
to property, it is necessary to understand the development of ecclesiastical
polity in relation to the state. Any proper understanding of this is not
complete without an examination of the effect of the Papal Revolution.
While modern scholars, often operating on a biased understanding of
progress and history, have a hard time seeing anything “traditional” or
“religious” as being revolutionary, it would be a great mistake to not see the
monumental effect that the Papal Revolution had on Western Europe.
The Papal Revolution of Gregory VII is considered Europe’s first “total
revolution.”124 The Papal Revolution sparked over what is called the
“investiture controversy,” essentially a struggle between the king and the
pope over who would have the power to appoint bishops.125 This also raised
the issue of who would elect the pope.126 A fundamental struggle ensued
between Gregory VII and the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV.127 In the
course of the revolution, the doctrine of the two swords came to
prominence.128 This doctrine asserted that the church was supreme both in
spiritual and temporal affairs.129

122. Id.
123. Id. Harold Berman chronicles the impact of canon law rules on many subjects,
including property law, it was used in the development of English common law. See generally
id.
124. Peter J. Leithart, Papal Revolution, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2007/02/papal-revolution.
125. Robert Louis Wilken, Gregory VII and the Politics of the Spirit, FIRST THINGS (Jan.
1999), http://www.firstthings.com/article/1999/01/003-gregory-vii-andthe-politics-of-thespirit.
126. Leithart, supra note 124.
127. The term fundamental is used here because the conflict struck at the very heart of
what the Church was as a polity in relation to the state.
128. Leithart, supra note 124.
129. See Doctrine of the Two Swords, OXFORD REFERENCE, http://www.oxfordreference.com/
view/10.1093/acref/9780198662624.001.0001/acref-9780198662624-e-5802 (last visited Oct. 4,
CULTURE,
2015);
Resource
Center,
Dictionary:
Two
Swords,
CATHOLIC
https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=36967 (last visited Oct.
4, 2015) (“We are taught by the words of the Gospel that in this Church and under her control
there are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal . . . both of these . . . the [spiritual] and the
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The Papal Revolution created a dualism within the political world,
contending that there were two sovereign powers.130 Some have suggested
that this dualism “created European freedom.”131 Dualism gave voice to the
idea of a new sovereign, which was “realized [in the form of] ‘the idea of a
trans-local organization, a corporation.’”132
“Freedom of the church” was a rallying cry born out of the Papal
Revolution.133 The Magna Carta, one of the cornerstone documents of
English liberty, states, “the English Church shall be free, and shall have its
rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired.”134 That clause of the
Magna Carta goes on to specifically protect the rights of the English Church
to elect their own officials, free from the interference of the king.135 This
clause reflected an intent on the part of Bishop Stephen Langton, as well as
the nobility, that the king not be allowed to interfere with the polity of the
church.
Enjoying a newfound independence in the wake of the Papal Revolution,
the church conducted itself in the manner of a trans-local corporation.136
Under the canon law system, the constitutional structure of the church was
expressed in the terms of corporation law.137 Importantly, this included the
temporal swords, are under the control of the Church. The first is wielded by the Church; the
second is wielded on behalf of the church.” (quoting Pope Boniface VIII)).
130. Leithart, supra note 124.
131. Id. (internal quotations omitted). European freedom can be said to have been
created by the carving out of free space in civil society. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. MAGNA CARTA, cl. 1., http://legacy.forham.edu/halsall/source/ magnacarta.asp (last
visited Nov. 21, 2015). The Magna Carta delineates the rights of the English Church as
follows:
First, that we have granted to God, and by this present charter have confirmed
for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church shall be free, and
shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired. That we wish
this so to be observed, appears from the fact that of our own free will, before the
outbreak of the present dispute between us and our barons, we granted and
confirmed by charter the freedom of the Church’s elections - a right reckoned
to be of the greatest necessity and importance to it - and caused this to be
confirmed by Pope Innocent III. This freedom we shall observe ourselves, and
desire to be observed in good faith by our heirs in perpetuity.
Id.
135. Id.
136. Leithart, supra note 124. This was evidenced by the fact that the English Catholic
Church was using confirmation from Pope Innocent III to assert its claims of independence
from the crown.
137. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 225.
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law of corporate jurisdiction over “particular classes of persons and
particular types of subject matter.”138
In terms of property law, ecclesiastical corporations owned ecclesiastical
property.139 Because property was owned by the corporation, it was
“committed to the purposes of the corporation.”140 This tied the property to
a particular purpose.141 Some examples of how ecclesiastical corporations
would find their expression include monastic houses, hospitals, universities,
dioceses, and even the papacy itself.142
2. Ecclesiastical Corporation Officers as Trustees
The officers of these ecclesiastical corporations acted as trustees for the
property owned by the ecclesiastical corporation in their charge.143 As
trustees, they had a legal duty under canon law to use the property for the
benefit of those for whom the property was acquired.144 This means that if
the property were set aside for use as a hospital, then the officers of the
hospital would be responsible for ensuring that the property was used for
that purpose.145 Interestingly, the secular English concept of trust that is
considered in this Note, finds its origin in the canon law designation of
property on the basis of its “use.”146
While the trustee was technically considered the owner of the property,
he was bound by law to administer the property for its intended use.147
Originally, this rule was within the jurisdiction of canon law, but in
England, through the progress of time, it eventually expanded to fall within
the jurisdiction of the Chancellor’s court.148

138. Id.
139. Id. at 239.
140. Id.
141. Id. This will prove to be of significance when one considers the general direction
that the law of implied trusts is trying to take ecclesiastical property ownership.
142. Id.
143. Id. It should be noted that the understanding of “trust” was somewhat different and
less specific than one would mean when using the term today.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (“[T]he English concept of the trust was derived historically from the concept of
the ‘use,’ which was known and used throughout Europe from the twelfth century on, and
which was developed in England in the chancellor’s court in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries.”).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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The three parties to a trust, and to the medieval “use,” were first, a donor,
now known as a settlor, defined as one who has placed the property in trust
for someone else, second, the donee, and third, the beneficiary.149 The
ecclesiastical corporation had the distinction of being both the donee and
the beneficiary.150 When one would donate a gift to the church, and the
ecclesiastical corporation’s officers would exercise the right to possess, the
right to transfer, or the right to use the property, the only condition was
that they had to do so in accordance with their duties as trustees.151 Another
concept used by the medieval canonists was that of a “corporation of
goods.”152 This concept has not been explicitly carried over into modern
English law but does find expression in the civil law systems of the
continent.153 The corporation of goods personifies the purpose for which
the property is to be used.154 Under this arrangement, the corporation
would consist not only of persons, but also of whatever good the
ecclesiastical organization was created to achieve, strongly tying the use of
the property to the purposes of the corporation.155
C. Reformation and Establishment of Religion
With the division of Christendom and the end of the medieval era, new
realities emerged. More specifically, for English and American law, the
establishment of the Church of England under Henry VIII marked the
beginning of a shift in the relation of civil authority to ecclesiastical
property.156 Under Henry, the Church of England declared itself
independent of papal authority, claiming continuity with the pre-separation
church, but asserting new leadership.
The headship of the Church of England shifted from the pope to the
king.157 This change in headship resulted in the creation of new institutions

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. This is still the rule in English and American corporate law. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 239-40.
155. Id.
156. See Church History, THE ANGLICAN DOMAIN, http://www.anglican.org/church/
ChurchHistory.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
157. R.B OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS: 15001860 15 (2006).
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and procedures to address appeals.158 It also resulted in changes in the
power of the church in relation to the crown. The English Reformation
changed the context of the exercise of governmental power.159 Before the
reformation, the church and crown had operated with legal systems that
were theoretically separate from one another, however, even before Henry
initiated the break with Rome, this was beginning to change.160
At the end of the 15th century, and increasingly until Henry came to
power, the church courts came under the supervision of the crown’s legal
apparatus.161 While the church and state were technically independent of
one another, time and circumstances had bound all of English society,
including the church, together in a more unified state.162 With increasing
regularity, disputes that would normally be settled within ecclesiastical
courts made their way into the king’s court.163 Certain inconspicuous
litigation would “regularly appl[y] common rules of property, obligations,
and wrongs to the affairs of the institutional church and to relationships
within the parish about religious subject matter.”164
When Henry became the head of the Church of England, it meant he
became the head of the church court system in England.165 While he allowed
the church courts to survive, their context was changed.166 Rather than
being viewed as the English arm of a foreign entity, the church courts in
England came to be viewed as an instrument under the control of the

158. Id. While there were some new procedures instituted, the basic structure and
administrative procedures within English ecclesiastical courts remained the same. Id.
159. ROBERT C. PALMER, SELLING THE CHURCH: THE ENGLISH PARISH IN LAW, COMMERCE,
AND RELIGION: 1350-1550 237 (2002).
160. Id. One reason for this change was the social upheaval brought on by the Black
Death. Id. at 48.
161. Id. at 237.
162. Id. at 15 (“ State and church remained independent structures, as dictated by the
flexible resolution of the Investiture Controversy of the eleventh century. Still, as in any
society, the independence of different governance structures was in many ways restricted to
form. Centuries and necessity had forged processes and accommodations that bound
England together under the monarch into a comparatively cohesive state.”).
163. Id. at 49.
164. PALMER, supra note 159, at 49 (“Church personnel often found royal courts more
convenient than ecclesiastical courts for handling problems. The king’s court acted on
person and property, rather than on one’s soul; in many contexts, that pragmatic approach
was more effective.”).
165. Id. at 237.
166. Id.
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king.167 This meant that there were new grounds for testing the relationship
between these church courts and the king’s court.168
Henry used the form of continuity to mask the changes occurring in both
jurisdiction and law.169 Under the new arrangement, property rights
changed and governmental power centralized.170 One result of this change
was the dissolution of religious houses.171 Religious houses had made
extensive use of the trustee-style “uses” concept.172 Specifically, religious
houses had been operating as beneficiaries in England since the fourteenth
century.173 Because the use system had required the property to be directed
for such a purpose as benefits the beneficiary, this created a moral dilemma
for what to do with the property belonging to monasteries and religious
houses.174 Henry eliminated this problem by giving the monasteries the legal
ownership interest instead of a merely beneficial interest.175 As a practical
matter, this move represented a localization of control. As mentioned
earlier, under the medieval system, the church was both the donee and
beneficiary.176 The possibility of external influence and control was
somewhat dissipated by localizing the control and giving legal interest to
the monastery. A statute passed in 1531 limited parish endowments by use
to twenty years.177
To create a framework for the new arrangement, Henry devised a statute
of uses.178 This statute expanded from the previous bill of primer seisen,
which treated the beneficiary “as if he were” seised.179 Under the statute the
beneficiary was in seisin.180 The significance of this shift is that these rights
were no longer flowing as a matter of canon law jurisprudence, but rather
through the statutes of a king. While the church enjoyed a non-adversarial

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See BERMAN, supra note 105.
PALMER, supra note 159, at 235.
Id. at 236.
Id.
See supra note 150.
PALMER, supra note 159, at 236.
Id.
Id. at 235.
Id.
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relationship in which it could depend on the state for patronage, it also
became more vulnerable to the state.181
D. Rise of Rationalism and Disestablishmentarianism
After the Church of England became the established church of the state,
dissent grew against the church holding this status. It was not that the
critics were charging the church with being corrupt, but the critics viewed
the church as being too hierarchical and too large, a “vast property-owning
organization.”182 Many Separatist and Puritan movements viewed this as
antithetical to New Testament principles.183
Traditionally, theorists viewed the established church as a public service,
provided by the government similar to transportation or protection.184
However, in his 1736 work entitled, Alliance between Church and State,
Bishop William Warburton suggested that churches exist apart from the
state, and that the established church is merely the particular church that is
chosen by the state to be established.185 By the mid-nineteenth century, this
was the mainstream view.186 It is also the view of the American states that
broke away from Britain and formed the United States.187 This is evident by
the First Amendment jurisprudence that cautions against giving a particular
church the preeminent place of being “established.”188 Soon, not only in the
former American colonies, but in other areas of the then-current British
Empire, the Church was being disestablished.189
When the church became disestablished, the courts began to apply the
same legal standards to the Church of England, or what had now become
known as the Episcopal Church, as was applied to the dissenting churches
under common law.190 There were three principles that formed the
jurisprudence towards the dissenting churches.191 First, the court would not
181. Id. at 49.
182. ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAY AUTHORITY AND THE REFORMATION IN
CHURCH: EDWARD I TO THE CIVIL WAR 187 (1982).
183. Id. at 188.
184. ROBERT E. RODES JR., LAW AND MODERNIZATION IN THE CHURCH
CHARLES II TO THE WELFARE STATE 318 (1991).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.
188. Id.
189. RHODES, supra note 184, at 321.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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intervene unless there was a justiciable issue.192 Usually a justiciable issue
would include issues such as property, but specific religious ministrations
would not be decided by the court.193 Second, a trust for a religious body
was treated in the same way any other charitable trust would be treated.194
The court considered the trust instrument in making this determination.195
So if a trust instrument stipulated that property was to be used for the
purposes of a particular denomination, then the court would enforce that
aspect of the instrument.196 Likewise, if the instrument stipulated that the
trustees submit to the authorities within a denomination, the court would
enforce that stipulation.197 Third, the individual members of a congregation
impliedly agreed to abide by the rules of the denomination by participating
in its affairs.198
In addition to the three principles, the British Judicial Committee added
a fourth principle regarding churches that were once established and now,
due to geographic and political changes were no longer established.199 If the
church had once had its affairs regulated by law, then its members and the
trustees of its property would be considered to have agreed to those rules.200
This Note has considered these principles because, even though the
Episcopal Church is not established in any American state, the legal
principles that lead to the establishment of an implied trust are applicable
here.
E. The Modern Era and Recent History
Today it is common among legal scholars to view religious polity in
terms of voluntary associations as opposed to ecclesiastical bodies existing

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. This is especially pertinent in Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the
U.S., where the Virginia Supreme Court considered it significant that the Falls Church
congregation had participated in the polity of the Episcopal Church. It found an implied
trust on this basis. 740 S.E.2d 530, 541- 42 (Va. 2013).
199. RODES, supra note 184, at 321.
200. Id. This was used for the Church of England in the colonies, and for the Roman
Catholic Church in French Canada. Id.
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as unique entities.201 Some legal scholars, many of whom make exclusivist
claims to modernity, assume from the outset that religious bodies are
completely on par and that they are the product of human choice as
opposed to divine purpose.202 Inherent with this view of the law is the
assumption that courts and administrative agencies must always make
decisions regarding religious polities within a civil legal framework.203
During the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, there was a gradual move
away from the trust doctrines related to purpose that had been present in
previous centuries.
Under English common law, a system of implied trusts had been
developed as a method for addressing intra-church property disputes.204
Part of this implied trust system involved an examination of the doctrine of
the church by the court, whereby the court determined whether one of the
parties had diverted from the original doctrine of the church.205 This
method was treated unfavorably in some lower American courts.206
A string of United States Supreme Court decisions, beginning with
Watson v. Jones, gradually chipped away at the common law maxim that the
court could tie the use of church property to doctrinal purpose.207 The
Watson Court disapproved the departure-from-doctrine element.208 The
Court “rejected the English doctrine of implied trust by deferring to the
decisions of church judicatory bodies.”209 It made the caveat that when the

201. Martin E. Marty & James A. Serritella, Religious Polity, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
85 (James A. Serritella et
al. eds. 1st ed. 2006) (“They may resent it that . . . ‘a church as church has no legal existence
in the United States. It is represented legally by a civil corporation’ and is ‘a voluntary
association of like-minded individuals, who are united on the basis of common beliefs for
the purpose of accomplishing tangible and defined objectives.’”).
202. Id. at 86.
203. Id.
204. H. Reese Hansen, Religious Organizations and the Law of Trusts, in RELIGIOUS
ORANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 286
(James A. Serritella et. Al. eds. 1st ed. 2006).
205. Id.
206. Hansen, supra note 204, at 286 (“In 1846, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the
doctrine [of implied trusts] noting that it depended on judicial consideration of church
doctrines, a practice that ‘could not . . . be tolerated in this country.’”).
207. Id. at 287 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871)).
208. Id. at 334; see generally Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
209. Hansen, supra note 204, at 287 (internal citation omitted).
IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW
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church had a congregational or independent societal form of government,
then the laws normally governing voluntary associations would be used.210
Because Watson involved only dicta against the departure-from-doctrine
element, numerous state courts continued to follow the common law
maxim.211 Due to the possible need for religious bodies to change doctrines
over time, these courts modified the departure-from-doctrine element.212 It
would require a “substantial” departure from doctrine before the court
would intervene against the deviating party.213 Some lamented the fact that
this forced courts to touch the question of doctrine and to consider how
important that particular doctrine was to the overall theology and practice
of the church.214
Nearly a century later, the Court held in Presbyterian Church in the
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church that the
use of the departure-from-doctrine element was unconstitutional.215 The
Court did not eliminate the possibility of using implied trusts, but stated
that only civil law principles may be considered in determining which party
will prevail.216 While the Hull Court discussed the use of neutral property
and trust law principles, it affirmed the principle of deferring to the highest
authority within a hierarchical religious polity.217 The Court then sustained
the permissibility of using neutral principles with its decision in Jones v.
Wolf. Currently, each state has the choice of applying either neutral
principles or deference, with some states applying a hybrid approach.218
210. Id. This raises a constitutional question as to whether congregational bodies may be
treated differently under the law as are hierarchical religious bodies.
211. Hansen, supra note 204, at 287.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 287-88.
215. Id. at 288.
216. Id. at 288 (“[T]here are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property
disputes, which can be applied without “establishing” churches to which property is awarded
. . . [T]he Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes
without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, States, religious
organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as
not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.” (quoting Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 449 (1969))).
217. Id. at 289 (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America
and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)).
218. Id. at 291 (“Since Hull and Jones, state court decisions have tended to divide into
three theoretical positions, two of which are roughly analogous to the strict deference and
strict neutral principles positions of the Supreme Court. The third approach purports to
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IV. FUTURE JUDICIAL POLICY AND THE FALLS CHURCH DECISION
A. How the Virginia Supreme Court Applied Neutral Principles
Historically, Virginia has disdained denominational trusts for
property.219 Hierarchical churches were prohibited from relying on
denominational trusts whether those trusts were expressed or implied.220 As
a matter of fact, when the Dennis Canon was enacted into the canons of the
Episcopal Church in 1979, the existing Virginia Code provision forbade
holding property in trust for a hierarchical church.221 Under Virginia Code
§ 57-7, the exercise of property rights were restricted to the congregational
level of ecclesiastical governance.222 It specifically made an allowance for the
conveyance, devising, and dedication of land for “the use and benefit of any
religious congregation.”223
The General Assembly changed its approach in 1993 when it amended
the Virginia Code to allow for hierarchical churches to hold property in
trust.224 Under Virginia Code § 57-7.1, property could be conveyed or held
in trust by any “church, church diocese, religious congregation or religious
society.”225 This meant that hierarchical churches could have congregations
hold the property in trust for the larger congregational bodies. Regarding
the change, Professor A.E. Dick Howard stated, “The General Assembly has
acted to sweep away that anachronistic and unconstitutional provision. In
enacting § 57–7.1, the legislature did what needed to be done.”226
There is some question as to whether the General Assembly had the right
to restrict the property rights of hierarchical churches in the first place.

follow neutral principles, but invariably interprets the documents examined as imposing
either an express or implied trust in favor of the church hierarchy on the disputed
property.”);
see also Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
219. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 537 (Va.
2013). “The General Assembly has not . . . validate[d] trusts for a general hierarchical church
and such trusts would be invalid.” Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 201 S.E.2d 752, 758 (Va.
1974).
220. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 537.
221. Id. at 539.
222. Id. at 538.
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (repealed 1993).
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (West 2005).
225. Id.
226. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 545 (McClanahan, J., concurring).
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Justice McClanahan addressed that point in her concurrence.227 It was her
opinion that the majority wrongly assumed that the Dennis Canon was void
because Virginia Code § 57-7 rendered it so.228 In her opinion, the First
Amendment prohibited former Code § 57-7, rendering it void in regards to
its effect on the Dennis Canon passed in 1979.229 The Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment places a bar on government entities establishing
any one religion.230 This would also prevent the Commonwealth from
treating one religious entity with more favor than another.
The majority did not agree with the constitutional argument and held
that the express trust created by the Dennis Canon was not valid under
Virginia law.231 Even though an express trust would have been valid before
the Virginia legislature enacted Code § 57-7, the statute as it existed served
to invalidate the trust.232 Therefore, the court stated that the Falls Church
property was not being held in an express trust for the Episcopal Church.233
B. Hybrid Approach
While the Virginia Supreme Court used the language of “neutral
principles” it was actually applying a hybrid approach.234 The hybrid
approach is identifiable based upon its use of the implied trust.235 Patty
Gerstenblith makes the point that the courts employing the hybrid
approach, “[w]hile employing the language of neutral principles and
examining church documents and state statutes . . . are nonetheless
applying a concept that is entirely unique to church-related cases.”236
Neutral principles involve making use of the property and contract law
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 545.
230. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.
231. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 539.
232. Id. “[U]nless the language shows a contrary intent, the language of an inter vivos
trust should be construed according to the law in effect at the time the trust is executed.”
McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Va. 2004).
233. Falls Church, 740 S.E.2d at 539 (“Thus, any express trusts purportedly created by the
Dennis Canon were ineffective in Virginia.”).
234. Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes among Religious
Organizations, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 335 (James A. Serritella et al. eds. 2006).
235. Id. (“[T]hose courts that apply the ‘hybrid’ approach to resolve church property
disputes, although claiming to adopt neutral principles, actually use the implied trust
theory.”).
236. Id.
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already available and at the disposal of the judges.237 This is one of the key
reasons that Justice Blackmun gave in Jones for applying the neutral
principles approach.238 For those who advocate use of the neutral principles
approach exclusively, anything outside of these secular principles is not
truly a neutral principles approach.239
C. Implied Trust
There are two circumstances when an implied trust is applied.240 The first
is a resulting trust that arises when “circumstances indicate that the settlor
did not intend the titleholder to take the entire interest in the property.”241
The other type of implied trust is a constructive trust, which is used as a
matter of equity.242 In Falls Church, the Virginia Supreme Court employed a
constructive trust.243
As noted above, the court applied a constructive trust because the
express trust set forth in the Dennis Canon was created before the Virginia
General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to allow for hierarchical
corporations to have property held for the general church in trust.244
Because there was a lack of statutory authority for the court to draw upon, it
had to employ a constructive trust to achieve an equitable result.245
The implied trust can be traced back to a time when religious
organizations were not recognized as corporations, a situation that still
exists in Virginia, and were prevented from owning property in their own
right.246 Instead, property conveyance would be made to the individual
minister or priest.247 This system was an early antecedent to the corporation
sole.248 There were other circumstances where the trust held by the religious

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
2013).
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).
Id.
Gerstenblith, supra note 234, at 335.
Id. at 331.
Id.
Id. at 331-332
Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 540 (Va.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 539-540.
Gerstenblith, supra note 234, at 333.
Id.
Id. A corporation sole is a corporation consisting of one person.
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leader was considered held for the benefit of the church or entire
denomination.249
D. Implied Trust and the Connection to Departure-From-Doctrine Theory
Critics of the implied trust theory compare it to the departure-fromdoctrine theory that the Supreme Court disapproved in Watson, and
declared unconstitutional in Hull.250 While critics acknowledge that the
doctrine element is no longer considered, they maintain that the deference
to the hierarchy that results from the implied trust is similar.251 Although
the modern implied trust approach does not include an analysis of doctrine,
it does defer to the hierarchy of the religious polity.252 This creates a
situation where “the hierarchy remains the beneficiary of the implied trust,
regardless of any doctrinal changes, and the faction loyal to the hierarchy
retains control of the local entity and its property.”253 The assumption is
that the local entity has impliedly agreed to follow the regulations of the
national organization.254 An examination of the relationship will determine
whether the local entity has agreed to the rules that the national
organization has set forth.255 In Falls Church, the court considered the
relationship between the Falls Church and the main Protestant Episcopal
Church.256 It considered the fact that Falls Church had received visiting
bishops from the general church, as well as the fact that Falls Church had
sought permission from the Diocese before encumbering property in the
past.257 It is clear, then, that the Virginia Supreme Court followed the
implied trust method of examining the relationship between the parties.

249. Id.
250. Id. at 334
251. Id. at 334 (“Without the requirement of loyalty to the original religious doctrine . . .
the hierarchy remains the beneficiary of the implied trust . . . .”).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 540-41 (Va.
2013).
257. Id. at 535.
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V. DIRECTION THAT THE COURTS SHOULD TAKE
A. Resurrect the Departure-from-Doctrine Principle
While the continued use of the implied trust doctrine is a good step, the
courts should follow through with the original intent of the implied trust
doctrine and reinstate the common law departure-from-doctrine principle.
There are two reasons why the Supreme Court should consider establishing
new precedent in this matter. First, the goal of an implied trust, historically,
has been to preserve the property for a particular purpose. If property
cannot be tied to purpose, then the need for an implied trust is greatly
diminished or eliminated. Second, there is no need for the court to redefine
the purpose for a particular piece of property. If property is to be held in
trust for a particular doctrinal or religious purpose and the court is unable
to even mention or consider that religious doctrine, then the court must
either arbitrarily declare the property to not be held in trust, or it must
arbitrarily change the purpose for holding the property.
The historical purpose of the implied trust doctrine is tied to retaining
the doctrinal loyalty of whatever party is in control of the encumbered
parcel. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania perhaps stated the issue best
when it held that “[t]he guarantee of religious freedom has nothing to do
with the property. It does not guarantee freedom to steal churches.”258 The
court went on to explain how the religious freedom element in question was
the freedom of the dissenting congregation to leave and establish a new
church on new property.259 There was not a freedom, however, to use
property that had been granted in the form of a trust for another purpose or
in pursuit of another doctrine than was intended in that trust.260 This was
the American view adopted from England where property was still tied to
doctrinal adherence as per the common law.261 The departure-fromdoctrine element was only slightly modified to distinguish between
fundamental and immaterial deviations.262 It was not until later in
American jurisprudence that the Supreme Court and other courts
decoupled doctrine from purpose and, in effect, forbade the use of implied
258. Justin M. Gardner, Ecclesiastical Divorce in Hierarchical Denominations and the
Resulting Custody Battle over Church Property: How the Supreme Court Has Needlessly
Rendered Church Property Trusts Ineffectual, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 235, 249-50 (2007).
259. Id. at 250.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 249 (“The implied trust doctrine, with its corollary departure-from-doctrine
test, became the accepted practice of England . . . .”).
262. Id.
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trusts to secure doctrinal ends.263 While the Court has decoupled a
departure-from-doctrine element from the implied trust doctrine, their
reasons for doing so are not entirely sound. The Watson Court and
subsequent courts assumed that the judiciary is forbidden from considering
religious doctrine. This, however, is not entirely true.
This raises the second point. It is unnecessary and improper for courts to
redefine the purposes for which an implied trust exists. There are other
instances where courts have recognized and given application to a certain
holding on the basis of religious doctrine.264 Recently, in United States v.
Meyers, Mitchell Meyers claimed that he was the founder and reverend of
the Church of Marijuana and that he had a religious command to use, grow,
possess, and distribute marijuana.265 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed Meyers’ conviction on the basis that his beliefs were not sufficient
to constitute religious belief.266 It examined whether the “religion” made
metaphysical claims and maintained rituals and a belief system.267 The court
was able to use a determination regarding religious doctrine in coming to
its conclusion. An inability to do this would have led to the court simply
having to take Mr. Meyers’ word that he was the founder of a new religion.
There is a difference between applying preexisting religious doctrines or
laws that the parties have bound themselves to and making
pronouncements regarding what that religious law or doctrine is.268 It
would not be a violation of the First Amendment for the courts to
acknowledge the factual existence of the religious doctrines of a
denomination and to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the
congregation or general church has deviated from that doctrinal standard.

263. The first time the U.S. Supreme Court took up a church property issue in Watson v.
Jones, it did not employ the older English common law departure from doctrine principle.
The Court noted that there was no express trust tying the property to the propagation of any
special religious dogma, only an understanding that the property was to remain with
whatever body could legitimately claim to be the congregation. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679,
726-27 (1871).
264. Gardner, supra note 258, at 258.
265. Id. at 260.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 261. One example used to explain this is that the courts cannot tell the Roman
Catholic Church who the Pope should be; however, it can acknowledge that there is a Pope.
The first is a normative determination; the second is a factual determination. Id.
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Even after Watson, various state courts did not have a problem making
these factual determinations.269
If the departure-from-doctrine element were restored, the outcome of
Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S. may have been
different. The question would have been whether the Virginia Supreme
Court believed that the general church’s move from standard Christian
orthodoxy on various matters constituted a fundamental departure. One of
the issues being debated is the nature of marriage. Because issues such as
marriage are so fundamental to the church’s self-understanding,270 the
Court would likely find a departure by either the individual congregation or
the general church on this matter to be a fundamental departure.
B. Deference to Religious Polities is Currently the Best Option
In the alternative, due to the precedent set in Hull, the best option for
courts to pursue is deference to the decisions of religious polities. The
Virginia Supreme Court recognized that without the departure-fromdoctrine element, the application of an implied trust would tie the purpose
of the property to use for the benefit of the general church. Congregations
are by their nature temporary. The congregation that existed in the Falls
Church of 1828 is not the same congregation that exists there today. The
congregation has considered itself, throughout its history, to be a
constituent part of the Episcopal Church. The Episcopal Church continues
to exist as a corporate body and therefore, the implied trust must be
understood in deference to the highest authority within the religious polity.
The application of a deference model would have produced the same
result here as in Falls Church. Because the Virginia Supreme Court
employed a hybrid approach,271 it applied an implied trust, which arrived at
the same result as would a strict deference model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a pluralistic society it is important that the religious customs and
practices of various groups be given the freedom to operate, provided they
do so within the boundaries of the law. It is legitimate for religious polities

269. Gerstenblith, supra note 234, at 334. The departure-from-doctrine element was
disapproved in Watson v. Jones but was not held unconstitutional until the Hull decision. Id.
270. Marriage is a sacrament of the Episcopal Church. THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, WHAT
WE BELIEVE, The Sacraments, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/sacraments (last visited
Dec. 29, 2014).
271. See supra Part IV(B).
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to create rules for how their material possessions are held and used. The
court’s role is to ensure that the corporate constitutions and contractual
understandings that exist between the factions of these religious polities be
enforced.
Some legal scholars, who are more than happy to see contracts regarding
business matters performed, suddenly become squeamish when presented
with enforcing the terms of a religious polity. Perhaps it is that they are not
knowledgeable enough in the history or traditions of the common law to
feel comfortable making such decisions. It could be that they are worried
that any legal recognition of religious polity or rules will be a violation of
the First Amendment. A more sinister possibility is that some of them want
to see religious polities receive limited or no recognition at all, due to a
desire to further push religion out of public life. Whatever the reason may
be, courts would do well to consider the historical and legal ramifications of
undermining religious polities. If religious polities are important to the
functioning of a pluralistic society, then this issue is perhaps of paramount
importance to the ability of our society to operate in cohesion.

